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I would like to congratulate Professors Gelman and Hennig with a paper that
bridges philosophical and statistical inquiry in an impressive way. They deserve credit
for taking subjective judgment out of the closet, and for showing how it improves sta-
tistical reasoning when applied in an transparent, open-minded, and empirically in-
formed fashion. This connects well to philosophical analysis of the social dimension of
objectivity: transparency about subjective assumptions facilitates scientific discussion,
opens up avenues for mutual criticism, and promotes the formation of a balanced,
informed judgment (Longino, 1990; Harding, 1991; Douglas, 2009; Sprenger, 2017b).
The paper is also notable for what it does not say: that objectivity corresponds
to value freedom, and that the impact of data on theory can be assessed without
reference to values. A long research tradition in philosophy of science has found this
ideal unattainable, especially in the context of inductive reasoning (e.g., Rudner, 1953;
Hempel, 1965; Douglas, 2000; Reiss and Sprenger, 2014). With regard to the role of
values in inference, I invite the authors to expand on the virtue of impartiality (Table
1, V3). Does it involve priority of evidence over values, or balancing values against
each other, as Douglas (2004, 2009) suggests?
The rest of this note is devoted to removing a common misunderstanding about
Bayesian inference. Gelman and Hennig write that Bayesian inference should not be
limited to the analysis of subjective beliefs (p. 26). I agree, but I would like to be
more radical and deny that Bayesian inference should be understood like this in the
first place. Probably no Bayesian statistician thinks that the prior distribution over
different parameter values mirrors her actual degrees of belief (see also Gelman and
Shalizi, 2013). Rather, the prior formalizes the degrees of belief she would have on the
supposition that the overarching statistical model is true. Of course, all these models
are highly idealized and most probably false. The prior and posterior distribution
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should not be understood as determining betting odds on the truth of the various
hypotheses; rather, they express relative plausibility judgments conditional on a given
model (Sprenger, 2017a).
Like anywhere in science, these judgments are only as reliable as the model from
which they are derived: garbage in, garbage out. The “Falsificationist Bayesianism”
discussed in Section 5.5 flows naturally from taking the subjective Bayesian approach
seriously. It makes explicit that inferences within a model need to be complemented
by checking the adequacy of the model itself. And I agree with Gelman and Hennig
that this critical perspective is vital for Bayesians in pursuit of scientific objectivity.
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